The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism: Neuroethics and Seeming States
Hossein Dabbagh
Covering moral intuition, self-evidence, non-inferentiality, moral emotion, and seeming states, Hossein Dabbagh defends the epistemology of moral intuitionism.
His line of analysis resists the empirical challenges derived from empirical moral psychology and reveals the seeming-based account of moral intuitionism as the only tenable one. The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism combines epistemological intuitionism with work in neuroethics to develop an account of the role that moral intuition and emotion play in moral judgment. Culminating in a convincing argument about the value of understanding moral intuitionism in terms of intellectual seeming and perceptual experience
His line of analysis resists the empirical challenges derived from empirical moral psychology and reveals the seeming-based account of moral intuitionism as the only tenable one. The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism combines epistemological intuitionism with work in neuroethics to develop an account of the role that moral intuition and emotion play in moral judgment. Culminating in a convincing argument about the value of understanding moral intuitionism in terms of intellectual seeming and perceptual experience
年:
2022
出版社:
Bloomsbury Academic
语言:
english
ISBN 10:
1350297607
ISBN 13:
9781350297609
文件:
PDF, 4.35 MB
IPFS:
,
english, 2022